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ABSTRACT 
 
Many commentators and guidelines endorse the view that clinical research is 
ethically acceptable only when it has social value, meaning that it collects data 
which can be used to improve health. A version of this social value 
requirement is included in the Declaration of Helsinki and the Nuremberg 
Code, and is codified in many national regulations. At the same time, there 
have been no systematic analyses of why social value is a requirement for 
clinical research. Recognizing this gap in the literature, a recent article by 
Alan Wertheimer argues that two of the extant justifications for the social 
value requirement are unpersuasive. Wertheimer concludes, contrary to 
current regulations and guidelines, that it may be acceptable to conduct 
clinical research which has no social value. The present paper attempts to 
assess this conclusion by critically evaluating the ethical and policy 
considerations relevant to the claim that clinical research must have social 
value. This analysis finds that the two arguments Wertheimer considers do 
not, on their own, provide a compelling justification for the social value 
requirement. However, evaluation of a broader range of ethical and policy 
considerations supports the standard view that social value is an ethical 
requirement for the vast majority of clinical trials and should be mandated by 
guidelines and policies.  
(211 words) 
 
 
1. BACKGROUND 
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Ethical analyses of clinical research attempt to identify the conditions under 
which it can be acceptable to expose participants to risks and burdens in order 
to evaluate medical treatments and interventions. Many analyses conclude that 
clinical research is acceptable only when it has social value. According to this 
‘social value requirement’ (SVR), clinical research that exposes participants to 
risks and burdens, but lacks social value, is unethical no matter what other 
positive features it might possess. 
Most guidelines for clinical research endorse the SVR.1 In the words of the 
Nuremberg Code, clinical research is acceptable only when it has the potential 
to yield “fruitful results for the good of society.”2 Some version of the SVR is 
also codified in many national regulations. For example, regulations from 
Kenya maintain that “clinical research must be valuable, meaning that it 
evaluates a diagnostic or therapeutic intervention that could lead to 
improvements in health or well-being.”3 
																																																								
1 World Medical Association. 2013. Declaration of Helsinki: Ethical 
principles for medical research involving human subjects. Available at: 
http://www.wma.net/en/30publications/10policies/b3/ [Accessed 12 January 
2016]. 
2 The Nuremberg Code. 1949. Available at: 
http://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/archive/nurcode.html [Accessed 12 October 2015]. 
3	National Council for Science and Technology. 2004. Guidelines for Ethical 
Conduct of Biomedical Research Involving Human Subjects in Kenya. 
Nairobi, NCST NO. 45. Available at: 
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Despite this widespread endorsement, there have been surprisingly few 
analyses of what constitutes socially valuable research,4 and almost no 
systematic analysis of whether in fact social value is a necessary condition for 
ethically acceptable clinical research.5 With this gap in mind, Alan 
Wertheimer has recently considered two possible justifications for what he 
calls a “universal and robust” SVR, and finds both of them wanting.6 
Werthheimer concludes that it may be acceptable to conduct clinical research 
that has no social value, provided study participants consent and are not 
exploited. 																																																																																																																																																	
https://www.healthresearchweb.org/files/Kenya_Guidelines_Ethical_conduct_
of_research_involving__human_subjects.pdf [Accessed 22 January 2016]. 
4 B. Freedman. Scientific Value and Validity as Ethical Requirements for 
Research: A Proposed Explication. IRB: Ethics & Hum Beh 1987: 7-10; J.H.T. 
Karlawish. Clinical Value: The Neglected Axis in the System of Research 
Ethics. Accountab Res 1999: 255-264; C. Grady. Thinking Further about 
Value: Commentary On a Taxonomy of Value in Clinical Research. IRB: 
Ethics & Hum Beh 2001; 24: 7-8; D. Resnik. Social Benefits of Human 
Subjects Resarch. J Clin Res Best Pract 2008; 4: 1-7; M. Habets, J.J.M. van 
Delden, & A.L. Bredenoord. The Social Value of Clinical Research. BMC 
Med Ethic 2014; 15: 66. 
5 D. Shaw & B.S. Elger. The Relevance of Relevance in Research. Swiss Med 
Wkly 2013; 143: w13792. 
6 A. Wertheimer. The Social Value Requirement Reconsidered. Bioethics. 
XXXX. 
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To assess this conclusion, the present paper critically evaluates the ethical 
arguments and policy considerations relevant to the SVR. Our analysis finds 
that the two arguments Wertheimer evaluates do not provide a compelling 
justification for this requirement. However, evaluation of a broader range of 
ethical and policy considerations provides strong support for the standard 
view: social value is an ethical requirement for clinical research and should be 
mandated by policy and regulation.  
 
2. SCOPE OF ANALYSIS 
2.1 Defining social value 
Clinical research is a subset of research with human participants that focuses 
on evaluating methods to prevent, treat or cure illness and disease, or on 
generating the knowledge necessary to develop such methods. We leave to 
others the question of whether social value is an ethical requirement for 
research involving human participants more generally, such as economics 
research that involves playing computer games to learn how humans make 
decisions under conditions of uncertainty. 
We assume the standard conception of social value according to which 
clinical research has social value to the extent that it collects data which can 
be used to improve health.7 Such data is gained, for example, by evaluating 
preventive, diagnostic, therapeutic or palliative interventions, or by conducting 
pathophysiological studies that are necessary to develop such interventions. 																																																								
7 E.J. Emanuel, D. Wendler & C. Grady. What Makes Clinical Research 
Ethical? JAMA 2000; 28: 2701-2711. 
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This includes studies that identify methods which do not work and thereby 
point the way to more promising approaches.  
The standard conception of social value does not exclude the possibility 
that clinical research may be socially valuable in ways that do not involve 
improvements in health. For example, clinical research can provide rewarding 
careers for scientists, employment for citizens, and a sense of fulfillment for 
participants. We will bracket these and other types of potential social benefit 
and assume that clinical research has social value only to the extent that it 
collects which may be used to improve health.  
 
2.2 Requiring social value 
The SVR holds that clinical trials must have the potential to improve health, 
not that they in fact do so. At least some studies turn out to have essentially no 
social value at all. For example, some clinical trials end up recruiting so few 
participants that they yield no useful information. These trials do not violate 
the SVR, provided there is sufficient reason to believe ex ante—at the time the 
trials are initiated—that they will yield data which can be used to improve 
health.  
Next, the SVR applies to studies, not to the enrollment of specific 
individuals in these studies. Imagine it is known ex ante that the enrollment of 
a specific individual will not contribute to, nor detract from the social value of 
a given study. As we will understand it, the SVR does not preclude enrollment 
of this individual. We also will not consider whether, in some cases, the SVR 
should be further specified regarding who should benefit, or in what ways. For 
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example, some guidelines require that research in low-resource settings must 
be responsive to the health needs of the communities in which it is 
conducted—in other words, it must have local social value.8 9  
Finally, we will not consider how the SVR should be implemented and 
enforced. Should the evaluation of whether a given study has social value be 
conducted by regulators or research ethics committees, research advocacy 
groups or funders—or someone else? And what should the responsible party 
do in response to studies that lack social value? Discourage them? Prohibit 
them? 
 
3. ETHICAL AND POLICY ARGUMENTS 
The following sections examine eight ethical and policy arguments that, taken 
together, provide strong support for an SVR. 
 
3.1 Protecting participants who cannot consent 																																																								
8 Council for International Organizations of Medical Sciences (CIOMS). 
International Ethical Guidelines for Biomedical Research Involving Human 
Subjects. 2002. Available at 
http://www.cioms.ch/publications/guidelines/guidelines_nov_2002_blurb.htm. 
[Accessed 12 October 2015]. 
9 S. Shah, R. Wolitz & E.J. Emanuel. Refocusing the Responsiveness 
Requirement. Bioethics 2013; 27: 151-159. 	.			
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There is considerable debate over when it is acceptable to expose individuals 
who cannot consent to research procedures that do not offer a prospect of 
clinical benefit (what we refer to as ‘net risk’ procedures). For example, under 
what conditions (if any) is it acceptable for healthy children to undergo a 
purely research lumbar puncture in order to establish normal levels for a 
protein in the cerebrospinal fluid? 
Commentators have offered a number of ethical justifications for net risk 
research with individuals who cannot consent.10 For present purposes, the 
important point is that all of these justifications require the research to be 
socially valuable. For example, some argue that it can be acceptable to enroll 
children in research involving net risks because it teaches them the value of 
helping others.11 As mentioned above, there are a number of ways in which 
clinical research may benefit others. It may help to advance investigators’ 
careers or realize a profit for the sponsoring company. However important 
these goals might be in other regards, they seem ill-suited to teaching children 
the value of altruism. In contrast, children can plausibly learn to appreciate the 
value of altruism by enrolling in studies that are designed to identify new 
methods for promoting the health of future patients.  																																																								
10 Reference withheld for review purposes 
11 W. Bartholome. The Ethics of Non-Therapeutic Clinical Research on 
Children. In: National Commission. Appendix to Report Recommendations: 
Research Involving Children 1977: 3.1-3.22; T.F. Ackerman. Moral Duties of 
Parents and Nontherapeutic Clinical Research Procedures Involving Children. 
Bioethics 1980; 2: 94-111. 
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Others argue that essentially everyone has realized benefits to their health 
as the result of prior net risk research, and everyone—including individuals 
who cannot consent—therefore has an obligation to participate in such 
research. This argument makes sense only to the extent that the research in 
question has the potential to improve health for future individuals.12 Still 
others maintain that participating in research with the potential to improve 
health offers the opportunity to contribute to the valuable activities that may 
benefit others. Doing so can thereby promote our interest in living a better life 
overall—even when the research involves some net risks and the participants 
cannot consent.13 in contrast, it is less clear that helping a company profit from 
a study of questionable social value contributes to a better life overall. In sum, 
this striking overlap of justifications provides strong support for a social value 
requirement with respect to net risk research with participants who cannot 
consent.  
 
 
3.2 Ensuring the acceptability of high-risk research with competent adults 
																																																								
12 J. Harris & S. Holm. Should We Presume Moral Turpitude in our 
Children?–Small Children and Consent to Medical Research. Theor Med 
Bioethics 2003; 24: 121-129; D.W. Brock. Ethical Issues in Exposing Children 
to Risks in Research. Children as Research Subjects: Science, Ethics and Law 
1994; 81-101. 
13 Reference withheld for review purposes 
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Respect for autonomy generally requires us to allow competent adults to make 
their own decisions and lead their own lives, even when they engage in risky 
activities that have little or no social value. For example, we should respect the 
decisions of competent adults to participate in reality TV shows that pose 
some net risks and have (arguably) no social value. With this in mind, imagine 
that a researcher proposes to enroll competent adults in a clinical trial that has 
little, if any social value, but has the potential to earn the sponsoring company 
a profit —perhaps the study of a drug that is so similar to already approved 
treatments in terms of side effects, route of administration, cost and so on, that 
it has no potential to benefit future patients. On what grounds might guidelines 
or regulations prohibit this study? 
Respect for autonomy is important. At the same time, society 
appropriately limits the activities of even competent adults, especially when it 
comes to inappropriate and high-risk activities. Reality TV shows that involve 
competent adults agreeing to swim across rivers and hike in the wilderness 
without a compass are permitted, but we would not permit a show involving 
Russian Roulette. Imagine that a TV station proposes a reality TV show, 
“Firing Squad”, in which competent adults are lined up against a wall. An 
executioner, equipped with a gun that contains one bullet in its 20 chambers, 
aims at the group and pulls the trigger. This show should not be permitted, 
even if the contestants are fully informed and give their voluntary consent, and 
even if they receive a significant amount of money for participating. 
One might cite a number of reasons to prohibit this show. It seems 
inappropriate to be entertained by possible executions; it might be traumatic to 
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those who watch it; it might trigger copycat incidents. But, even if all these 
concerns are addressed—imagine the game is played in private and not 
televised—it still should be prohibited. Why? Briefly, morality is not 
exhausted by respect for competent adults’ ability to make their own 
decisions. It can be appropriate to prohibit an activity because it poses 
significant net risks and has little redeeming value. For example, it can be 
appropriate to prohibit entrepreneurs from offering employment to produce 
something as mundane as fancy dresses under high-risk conditions. In 
contrast, activities that pose significant net risks, but have important social 
value are rightly considered ethical, even praiseworthy. For instance, 
competent consenting adults often are praised for assuming high net risks 
when fighting fires or safeguarding national security.14 
Although it is difficult to determine precisely where to draw the line 
between ethical and unethical activities, a plausible heuristic is to consider 
whether an activity, given its value and the net risks involved, is reasonable 
from the perspective of an ideal social arbiter.15 This heuristic provides a 
standard for determining whether an activity should be prohibited on moral 
grounds. When fair consideration of all affected parties suggests that the risks 
of an activity are excessive compared to its potential social benefits, society 
has strong reason to prohibit it, even when it involves consenting adults. This 																																																								
14 Even in these cases, there remains an obligation to reduce the risks where 
possible, suggesting that the risks of even very valuable research should be 
reduced as well.  
15 Reference withheld for review purposes 
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analysis suggests that high net risk research with competent adults should be 
permitted only when it satisfies the SVR. 
 
3.3 Maintaining researcher integrity 
Clinical research does not involve participants merely facing risks; research 
risks are not analogous to the risk of being attacked by a bear while on a hike. 
Clinical investigators actively and intentionally expose participants to risks, 
frequently by invading their bodies to inject investigational agents or remove 
samples, or by asking sensitive health-related questions. These features raise 
the question of what constitutes appropriate behavior on the part of 
investigators.16 
As Alan Wertheimer points out, there is no comprehensive account of 
appropriate investigator behavior.17 Wertheimer also highlights the fact that 
the point of ethical guidance for clinical research is typically understood as 
protecting participants’ rights and interests, not preventing investigators from 
acting inappropriately. However, the absence of a comprehensive account of 
appropriate investigator behavior, and the general emphasis on protecting 
participants, does not imply that limits on investigator behavior must all be 
grounded in protecting participants.    
Imagine a study that involves participants undergoing a lumbar puncture 
without anaesthetic merely to see how painful it is. Further imagine that 
participants are fully informed and paid for their participation. This study is 																																																								
16 Reference withheld for review purposes 
17 Wertheimer, XXXX, op. cit. 
13		
not clearly problematic in the way that a study involving very high net risks 
would be, analogous to the “Firing Squad” TV show. In particular, given the 
relatively moderate net risks of a lumbar puncture, it is not clear that this study 
is unethical in virtue of exposing participants to excessive risks. Yet, research 
ethics is not just about what happens to participants; it is also about what 
investigators do to them as moral agents.18 Investigators should not insert 
needles into participants’ spinal columns and intentionally inflict pain without 
a good reason, thus raising the question: When can it be acceptable for 
investigators to interact with participants in ways that expose them to net 
risks?  
Individuals’ rights to bodily integrity and privacy place strong ethical 
claims against investigators inserting a needle into participants’ bodies or 
asking sensitive questions purely for research purposes. However, by giving 
valid consent, competent adults waive their rights against being so treated. 
Hence, if there are limits on how investigators can treat consenting adults in 
the context of net risk research, these limits must have some source other than 
participants’ rights.  
While we do not have a complete (or even partial) account of agent-
centered limitations in clinical research, it seems clear that these limits go 
beyond prohibiting investigators from violating participants’ rights. 
Investigators also need positive reasons to justify their studies. In the above 
lumbar puncture study, there needs to be a positive reason why investigators 																																																								
18 T. Nagel. Mortal Questions. 2012. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University 
Press. 
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insert needles into participants’ backs, inflicting pain and exposing them to net 
risks. Absent the potential to benefit participants clinically, the potential to 
learn something important for improving health provides a clear and strong 
justification.19 In this case, an investigator can say: “Yes, I am inserting a 
needle into your spinal column for research purposes, but I do this as part of a 
valuable effort to gain information that has the potential to improve the health 
of future patients.” Other possible benefits of conducting clinical trials do not 
seem to yield a compelling justification for investigators’ behavior. For 
example: “I am inserting this needle into your spinal column in order to earn 
tenure”. 
 
3.4 Avoiding participant deception 
Society benefits from clinical research and takes active steps to promote it, 
primarily through efforts to advance and encourage the view that clinical 
research is socially valuable. Empirical data suggest that these efforts have 
been successful. In a recent global survey, 77% of 5701 respondents indicated 
that individuals who participate in clinical research make a valuable 
contribution to science and society.20 																																																								
19 Emanuel et al, op. cit. 
20 Center for Information and Study on Clinical Research Participation. 
2013). Perceptions and Insights Study: Public and Patient Perceptions of 
Clinical Research. Report on general perceptions. Available at: 
https://www.ciscrp.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/01/2013-CISCRP-Study-
General-Perceptions.pdf [Accessed 11 February 2015]. 
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Empirical studies also find that the potential to help future patients is an 
important reason why many individuals enroll in clinical research, especially 
in studies that offer no prospect of clinical benefit.21 Relying on this 
motivation to enroll individuals in research that lacks social value involves a 
kind of deception or fraud. It involves investigators relying on subjects’ false 
belief to get them to enroll in studies that conflict with their clinical interests. 
The SVR protects participants against this fraudulent behavior by ensuring 
that net risk studies have the potential to benefit future patients. Moreover, to 
the extent that society, by promulgating and encouraging the view that clinical 
research is socially valuable, is responsible for individuals’ belief, the SVR 
protects society from becoming complicit in this fraud. 
A different way to avoid participant deception would be simply to inform 
prospective participants that a given study lacks social value. However, it 
seems unlikely that investigators would adopt this approach. They likely 
would be unwilling to admit that their studies lack social value and likely 
would be concerned that candor in this regard would deter individuals from 
enrolling. Moreover, as we discuss below, informing participants that some 
studies lack social value may undermine public trust in clinical research in 
general. These considerations suggest that, at least in the world we inhabit, the 
SVR is a key safeguard against deception in clinical research that poses net 
risks.    																																																								21	L. Stunkel & C. Grady. More than the money: a review of the literature 
examining health volunteer motivations. Contemp Clin Trials 2011; 32(2): 
342-52. 	
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3.5 Safeguarding against exploitation 
The SVR has been cited as an important protection against the exploitation of 
research participants.22 In response, Alan Wertheimer has argued that the SVR 
actually increases the potential for exploitation.23 To make this argument, 
Wertheimer appeals to his own account, according to which exploitation 
occurs when a specific transaction places an unfair balance of risks and 
benefits on one or more of the parties to the transaction.24 On this account, 
research participants are exploited when they receive an unfair share of the 
benefits of a study, given the risks and burdens they assume, and the extent to 
which others benefit from their participation.25 Since the SVR mandates that 
clinical trials must have the potential to benefit future patients, and there might 
be millions of them, Wertheimer concludes that it actually increases the 
chances that participants will be exploited.  
Wertheimer’s argument makes sense, but only to the extent that one 
focuses on individual research studies.26 Things look very different when we 
																																																								
22 Emanuel et al, op. cit. 
23 Wertheimer, XXXX, op. cit. 
24 A. Wertheimer. Exploitation. Princeton University Press, 1999. 
25 A. Wertheimer. Rethinking the Ethics of Clinical Research: Widening the 
lens. Oxford University Press, 2010. 
26 Wertheimer’s argument also depends on his account of exploitation. For 
present purposes, we bracket possible criticism of this account and instead 
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consider clinical research as a cooperative enterprise that is designed, through 
the conduct of numerous studies over many years, to improve health for all 
citizens. At this level, the potential for exploitation depends not simply on the 
distribution of benefits and burdens within a given study, but on the 
distribution of benefits and burdens across the enterprise as a whole. If 
participants face net risks and burdens as part of a socially valuable study, but 
are denied access to the results of research, then contributing to studies with 
social value can indeed increase the potential for exploitation as Wertheimer 
claims. In contrast, as part of a collective program to which everyone 
contributes, and from which everyone benefits, an SVR can reduce the 
potential for exploitation. It can ensure that clinical research generates benefits 
for all those who contribute to it 
Unfortunately, mechanisms to ensure equitable access to the benefits of 
clinical research do not exist in all countries, let alone beyond national 
boundaries, and only a small number of people participate in research studies. 
This raises concern that, in many places, the SVR represents a less than ideal 
safeguard against exploitation. This is important because Wertheimer offers a 
more straightforward approach. He writes: “If payment should be regarded as 
a benefit, then subjects are not exploited if the payment is sufficient to 
adequately compensate them for the risks and burdens of participation even if 
the research is entirely lacking in social value.”27   
																																																																																																																																																	
focus on showing that a SVR is a compelling way of avoiding exploitation—
on Wertheimer’s own account—given current research practices.    					
27	Wertheimer, xxx	
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While this argument makes sense in theory, it would require what strikes 
us as an extremely unlikely change in practice. In particular, compensating 
participants for the risks and burdens they face is not sufficient to avoid 
exploitation; the level of compensation would also need to take into account 
the extent to which others benefit from participants’ involvement. For 
example, a series of clinical trials can yield large profits for a company. 
Obviously, a range of individuals contribute to the successful development of 
a new intervention, and the claims of all of them would need to be considered 
in any fair distribution. However, the contributions of research participants 
can be crucial and their fair share of the profits may be significant. A small 
number of participants who are instrumental to the development of an 
intervention that produces tens of billions of dollars in profit might need to 
receive hundreds of thousands of dollars to ensure a fair transaction.  
It seems unlikely, at least in the foreseeable future, that participants will 
receive this level of compensation. Sponsors would be reluctant to pay 
participants at this level. And doing so would change in substantial ways how 
we understand the role of research participants, what it means to obtain their 
voluntary informed consent, and so on. Uncertainty about these changes likely 
increases sponsors’ reluctance to address the potential for exploitation through 
payment. This suggests that a SVR represents an important component of 
what currently appears to be the best (albeit imperfect) approach to addressing 
concerns about exploiting research participants.  
 
3.6 Stewardship of public resources 
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Public officials have an obligation to exercise stewardship of public resources 
by spending them in ways that promote socially valuable goals. This 
obligation is not specific to research, but applies to public expenditures in 
general. As mentioned, there are different socially valuable goals that might be 
promoted by research, such as employment or economic activity. However 
important they may be, these goals can be realized in other ways. In contrast, 
clinical research is vital to developing and evaluating interventions that have 
the potential to improve health. The importance of this goal, and the absence 
of alternative ways to achieve it, provides strong reason to insist that the 
approximately 1/3 of all clinical research studies which are publicly funded 
satisfy an SVR.28  
Granting this, Wertheimer points out that “corporations are permitted to 
spend their resources as they see fit, subject to specific constraints such as not 
marketing drugs that have not been approved by the regulating agency.”29 This 
view implies that private companies may use their own resources to fund 
clinical trials that have no social value, provided the risks are not excessive 
and participants give voluntary informed consent. This argument overlooks 
the numerous public contributions to privately funded research. For example, 
the early phase studies on which many company studies are based are often 
publicly funded. In addition, much of the infrastructure on which clinical trials 																																																								
28 J. Chakma, G.H. Sun, J.D. Steinberg, S.M. Sammut & R. Jagsi. Asia's 
Ascent — Global Trends in Biomedical R&D Expenditures. N Engl J Med 
2014; 370: 3-6. 
29 Wertheimer, XXXX, op. cit. 
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depends, such as the methods that are used in clinical research, trace to public 
support and funding. Governments also help to train the investigators and 
clinicians that are needed to run clinical trials, and contribute to the review, 
approval and reimbursement of the products that are developed through 
commercial studies. The magnitude of these contributions varies widely and 
will be low for some studies, as well as difficult to estimate in any precise 
way. Nonetheless, there remains at least some public support for essentially 
every privately funded study.  
One might argue that governments can provide this support to 
pharmaceutical companies without insisting on any specific conditions in 
return. Whether this is right depends on whether doing so is consistent with 
the obligation to exercise proper stewardship of public resources. Whatever 
that analysis might suggest, requiring clinical trials to have social value 
ensures that the provision of these benefits is consistent with appropriate 
stewardship of public resources. This conclusion does not imply that all 
clinical research studies should be required to have significant social value. 
Instead, it suggests that all clinical research studies, including those that are 
(mostly) privately funded, pose low to moderate net risks, and enroll only 
competent adults, should be required to have sufficient social value, where the 
level of required value is a function of the degree of public contributions that 
went into the study. 
 
3.7 Promoting public trust 
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Clinical research provides significant benefits to society. Generation and 
preservation of these benefits depends on public trust in and support of clinical 
research.30 With the SVR in place, potential participants can be assured that 
they will be invited to face the risks and burdens of clinical research only 
when the studies have the potential to improve health. In this way, an SVR 
provides an important protection for public trust in clinical research and 
hence, indirectly, for the enterprise of clinical research itself. In response, 
Wertheimer points out that the extent to which clinical research depends on 
public trust is “an empirical question that requires much more investigation.”31 
However, as he also points out, it is plausible to think that social value is 
important for public trust in clinical research. The question we face, then, is 
one of which policy to adopt absent robust data on the importance of public 
trust. 
The potential costs of not requiring social value could be enormous if, in 
fact, clinical research depends significantly on public trust. In particular, some 
clinical trials are necessary to achieving fundamentally important goals related 
to promoting health. For example, identifying effective ways to treat malaria 
and prevent HIV infection depends on clinical trials. Hence, to the extent that 
allowing clinical trials which have no social value might undermine trust in 
and support for these trials, the consequences could be devastating. To see 																																																								
30 A.J. London. A Non-Paternalistic Model of Research Ethics and Oversight: 
Assessing the Benefits of Prospective Review. J Law, Med Ethics 2012; 40: 
930–944. 
31 Wertheimer, XXXX, op. cit. 
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this, imagine that sponsors and researchers are permitted to conduct clinical 
trials that have no social value, provided the net risks are low or moderate and 
competent adults provide informed consent. We can expect that at least some 
trials will be conducted for frivolous reasons, for no reason, and even for 
harmful reasons. In the long run, communities may come to regard clinical 
research with suspicion and be unwilling to participate. One might hope that 
permitting both valuable studies and studies that have no social value will not 
necessarily undermine trust in clinical research in general. For example, 
investigators and funders might be required to make clear whether a given 
study has social value, perhaps by placing in bold letters on consent forms: 
“This study does not have any potential to help improve health. Instead, it is 
being conducted to make money for Company X.” This approach might lead to 
the public having trust in and supporting those studies that have social value, 
while regarding studies that have no social value in a different light—for 
example, as means for employment or earning a profit.32   
This outcome seems possible, but unlikely. Recall that we are limiting the 
present argument to clinical research defined as a subset of research that 
focuses on evaluating methods to prevent, treat, and cure illness and disease, 
or gathering the knowledge necessary for developing such methods. As a 
result, the average person typically is not in a position to judge whether a 
given research study justifies the net risks and burdens it poses. Instead, they 																																																								32	Moreover, if successful, this approach would also address the potential for 
participant deception discussed above (section 3.4) without insisting on an 
SVR.	
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rely on this being the case, and adoption of an SVR ensures that this is in fact 
so. 
This thought experiment suggests that the potential costs of adopting 
policies that dispense with a SVR could be significant. How do these costs 
compare to the potential benefits of doing so? Presumably, the SVR blocks 
some studies that individuals want to conduct and others are willing to 
participate in. This is a cost, although likely a very modest one. Beyond this, 
there are few costs to endorsing an SVR. Even if we did not require that 
research have social value, we would still need a system to ensure that 
participants’ rights and interests are protected. Given that implementation of 
the SVR likely can be incorporated into this system with few additional costs, 
it seems unlikely—albeit an empirical question—that the costs of requiring 
social value as a matter of policy outweigh the assurance this provides in 
maintaining public trust. 
 
3.8 Cases versus policies 
The argument to this point does not preclude the possibility that there are 
some studies to which the above arguments in support of a SVR do not apply. 
In particular, the arguments for requiring social value do not apply to studies 
that meet all of the following conditions: 1) enroll competent participants who 
understand that the study has no potential social value; 2) pose no greater than 
moderate net risks; 3) are consistent with conditions on appropriate 
investigator behavior; 4) compensate participants commensurate with any net 
risks and burdens they face and the extent to which their contribution benefits 
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others; 5) are done in a sufficiently private way; 6) do not use public funds; 7) 
do not rely on prior studies that were supported by public funds; and 8) do not 
rely on publicly funded review, approval or reimbursement mechanisms.  
Are there studies that satisfy all of these conditions? We are not sure. If 
such studies exist, social value may not be a requirement for them. However, 
to the extent that the SVR is part of public policy, it is not clear that these 
studies matter. Public policies are never fully appropriate for every single case 
that falls under them. In addition, depending on how complicated it would be, 
implementation of a system to allow valueless studies might lead to many 
false positive mistakes—that is, valueless studies that are conducted but 
should not have been conducted. This provides further reason for the relevant 
policies to require social value for all clinical research studies. 
 
4. OBJECTIONS AND REPLIES 
Critics might argue that the present analysis establishes only that social value 
(combined with other standard requirements, such as informed consent) is a 
sufficient condition for ethical clinical research. We have not demonstrated 
that every possible way of regulating clinical research that does not involve an 
SVR is ethically problematic. Hence, we have failed to support the standard 
view that social value is a necessary requirement for ethical clinical research.  
We admit to not having canvassed every possible way of regulating 
research without social value and proven that all of them are problematic. If 
this standard for proving necessity is applied, we have failed to meet it. 
However, we are not sure—at least in applied ethical reasoning—that anyone 
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ever meets this standard. In contrast, we do think we have shown that, given 
the world we live in, and the way that clinical research is conducted in that 
world, failure to enforce an SVR would lead to problematic studies and overall 
worse research outcomes. It is in this sense that we conclude that the SVR is 
necessary for ethical research.  
Critics might also argue that our arguments blend ethics and policy, and 
that it is therefore unclear whether social value is required as a matter of ethics 
or as a matter of good policy. In our view, it is both, although it can be 
difficult to draw a clear distinction between the two. Even the argument that 
most clearly appeals to policy considerations—cases versus policies—has 
moral salience insofar as it highlights the moral importance of balancing false 
positive and false negative errors when setting public policy.   
 
5. CONCLUSION 
The present analysis identifies eight ethical and policy considerations that 
together provide strong support for an SVR. Mandating that clinical trials 
must have (sufficient) social value is important for protecting participants who 
cannot consent, preventing inappropriate research that poses high net risks, 
and promoting appropriate investigator behavior. Absent an alternative 
approach, an SVR also provides some protection against participant deception 
and participant exploitation. Moreover, an SVR helps to ensure proper 
stewardship of public resources and promotes public trust and support for 
clinical research, thereby helping to secure the conditions necessary to 
continue to improve health. Taken together, these considerations provide 
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strong support for the claim that social value is an ethical requirement for 
clinical research and should be mandated by guidelines and policy. 
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